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A. INTRODUCTION
Earnscliffe Research and Communications is pleased to present this
report to the Independence Standards Board (ISB). It is based on a
total of 131 one on one interviews conducted over a four-month
period. The interviewees were selected, in roughly equal measure
from the following segments:
CEO’s of SEC registrant companies

16

CFO’s of SEC registrants

24

Chairs of Audit committees of such companies

18

Buy side investment analysts

18

Sell side investment analysts

17

Audit partners

19

Regulators

19

The sample was distributed roughly equally across these groups, as
indicated below. Interviews were done in person or on the phone,
based on the preference of the interviewee. A complete listing of
those who were interviewed is attached to this report as Appendix A.
The objective of this research undertaking was to assess the
perceptions of different audiences around the question of auditor
independence and objectivity. As part of the enquiry, interviewees
were asked to consider whether they thought a problem currently did
exist, what the ideal mix of safeguards would be, and which priorities
they would set for the future in this area.
The interviews followed a semi-structured agenda, ensuring that each
interview captured a certain amount of essential information, but also
allowing the interviewee latitude to take the interview in a direction
that reflected their personal experiences and perspectives. The
interview guide used is attached to this report as Appendix B.
Bruce Anderson, Principal and one of the founding partners of the
Earnscliffe Strategy Group, Canada’s best respected public affairs
firm, designed the research program, conducted more than 60% of
the interviews, and authored this report. Questions and comments
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are welcomed and may be addressed to him directly, at 613-2338080, or by email at anderson@earnscliffe.ca
We would like to acknowledge the helpful guidance of the ISB Board,
and the considerable assistance of the ISB staff, led by Art Siegel, in
the development and execution of this project. The project has been
a highly interesting and challenging assignment and our work with the
ISB has been most enjoyable.
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B. THE OVERALL HEALTH OF FINANCIAL REPORTING
Each of the interviews began with a discussion of the participant’s
view of the quality and reliability of the financial reporting system in
the US. The results of this probing are very helpful in setting the
context for the findings around auditor independence issues, and can
be summarized as follows:


With very few exceptions, interviewees felt that the standard
of financial reporting in the US was excellent. They indicated
that they felt it was the highest standard that existed in the world
today, had been for a long time, and would continue to be in the
future.



While the vast majority felt that restatements of earnings and
stories of misrepresentation of financial results seemed
more prominent, relatively few were convinced that
misbehavior was really rising. More often, interviewees felt that
the combination of a bull market with broad (and anxious)
participation, coupled with a huge increase in media coverage of
markets and investments was giving an impression of a rise in
problems.



The general consensus seemed to be that there might be a
slight deterioration of integrity over time, but no more
significant in the financial and business sector than in
society as a whole. Many people voiced the opinion that the
more fast-paced, highly competitive global economy meant that
individual executives felt more at risk and therefore possibly
tempted to be more aggressive than they might have been in the
past. They were also saying that while more people might feel
more tempted to act inappropriately, the number who acted on
that temptation might not be much different than in the past.



A fair sized minority (probably 40% of the total sample) took
the view that while the standard of financial reporting in the
US was excellent, reporting requirements were becoming
unreasonably complex. They argued that the average investor
(meaning even the average institutional investor) could not really
digest some of the material that was now being required, by
changes in accounting standards. It should be noted that a fair
number of analysts agreed with this point of view. Others argued
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the opposite case, and said that even more reform was needed to
accounting standards in order to ensure that today’s newer, more
complex business transactions did not allow room to mislead
investors.


Several of the regulators interviewed worried that their
organizations were finding it difficult to keep pace with the
changes in the increasingly global and complex transactions
which companies were entering into. This contributed to a
sense that investors might be at greater, and less apparent, risk
than they had been in years past.



Despite the concerns just listed, the overall sentiment about
financial reporting was positive, and respondents attributed this to
several factors:
i.

The fact that most people involved in the process had
integrity and cared about doing a proper job. This benefit
of the doubt was conferred equally on CEO’s, CFO’s and
auditors. As such, participants signaled a view which was an
important underpinning of their attitudes around a number of
issues probed subsequently: auditors are not seen as any
more or less likely to act with integrity than are their clients.
While everyone acknowledged that one of the auditors’
functions is to protect investors against malfeasance, the
assumption was that this service was not frequently called
upon.

ii. The fact that litigation pressures served as a deterrent for
those who might be inclined otherwise. Some offered this
point of view with a sense of dismay, lamenting that “too often
we teach by lawsuit”, others simply saw it as a fact of business
life.
iii. The fact that rules and regulations existed, along with
oversight, as a way of further deterring, finding and
penalizing inappropriate action.
For the most part,
respondents felt that the fewer, and more simple the rules, the
better from the standpoint of both investor protection and the
cost of doing business. At the same time, there was a
widespread acknowledgement that a considerable amount of
rules and oversight was needed, given the size and
complexity of the financial markets.
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iv. The fact that most companies of any size cared greatly
about having a pristine reputation in order to have low
cost access to capital. Many CEO’s and CFO’s indicated
that a problem that required earnings restatement was a major
problem for them, something they very much wanted to avoid.
In this sense, they looked upon auditors as an additional
check to ensure that their companies were reporting
appropriately, to save embarrassment down the road.

“It’s the auditor’s job
to say when the rules
are being bent to
breaking” CEO

KEY FINDING
FINANCIAL REPORTING GENERALLY WELL REGARDED
Reasons:
 Integrity of participants, including auditors
 Litigation pressures
 Rules, regulations, standards
 Desire for access to capital



The annual audited financial statement is seen as an
important part of financial reporting, however, its’ role has
become more secondary over time. Most participants noted
that investment decisions are increasingly made on the basis of
more time sensitive, than that which is contained in the annual
report. While asserting that audited financials were a basic
requirement, their role in investment decisions was seen as
providing confirmation and reassurance about information that
was already in the public domain.
A number of participants, most notably among the analyst
community, also said that the data that affects investment
decisions is increasingly somewhat different than the more
standard categories included in the annual report.



The mood among most respondents, with the exception of
regulators, was that caution was necessary when raising the
level of public debate about financial reporting and its
reliability.
Everyone acknowledged they had a stake in
maintaining a high level of public and investor confidence in the
underpinnings of the market. Since the market had been
performing well for most, there was a disinclination to do anything
that might disturb things. Regulators took the view that the
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debate about how best to sustain confidence in the markets was
a critical one to have now and better to have it now than in the
wake of some debilitating future correction. They felt that strong
language was occasionally necessary to catalyze a debate that
others might be reluctant to engage in.
In summary, most of those interviewed were quite satisfied with the
overall quality and reliability of the information which companies were
making available to investors. They felt it was the best in the world
and had been improving over time. Most doubted that there was a
significantly greater effort to misrepresent performance than there
had been in the past, and cited a number of factors, which they felt
were useful checks against inappropriate behavior.
The role of the external audit and the auditor were seen as important
checks, but not the only or necessarily predominant ones. They
expected that annual audits would help deter or expose earnings
reporting problems, but they also assumed that the more frequent
disclosures from companies to markets represented an area of
increasing risk.
While expressing broad satisfaction, there was a sense that markets
were becoming more complex, competitive and aggressive all the
time, and that scrutiny was on the rise as well. This led most to
conclude that a debate about standards for auditor independence
and objectivity was legitimate. At the same time, many (a majority
among auditors, and probably 30% of other non-regulatory
segments) worried that the profile, tone and the tenor of the debate
might serve to frighten more than enlighten investors.
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C. THE BROAD VIEW OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
In order to fully understand what people think should be done to
assure auditor independence in the future, it is useful to begin with an
understanding of to what degree there is a perceived need for
change.
During the course of the interviews, it became clear that most of the
audience segment were in general agreement around this question.
Their opinions can be summarized as follows:


In general, respondents had a positive view of auditors and
the way in which they performed their jobs. Underneath this
generally positive view, emerged a number of interesting and
occasionally conflicting findings.
i.

Some chafed at the fees charged by audit firms, while others
talked about the depth and competence that their auditors
offered. Often people did both.

ii. Some lamented that auditors seemed not as respected as
they had been in the past. Others offered the view that the
work of the auditor was mundane, not all that interesting or
challenging. A surprising number expressed both views,
despite the irony.
iii. Some felt that the profession had not done a very good job of
protecting its reputation over time, while others noted that
auditors deserved greater respect for integrity than investment
bankers and lawyers.
Overall, however, there was a feeling that auditors were
professional, competent, and played an important role in the
functioning of financial markets, even if the prominence or luster
of that role was in relative decline.


The vast majority of respondents believe that auditors are
currently performing audits, which meet a high standard of
objectivity and independence. They believe that audit firms
take their responsibilities seriously in this regard. They also
maintain that clients who attempt to compromise the auditor’s
independence are few and far between. They expect that several
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factors are helping ensure that auditors take their responsibilities
seriously:
i.

their training in the unique responsibilities of public
accountants

ii. their firms’ concerns about reputation (based on the reliability
of financial statements it attested to) and its importance to
future success
iii. their firms’ concern about legal liability
iv. the personal integrity of the auditor
v. the auditor’s desire to protect his or her reputation and career
KEY FINDING
AUDITORS CURRENTLY MEET HIGH STANDARD OF
INDEPENDENCE
Reasons:
 Training in Public Responsibility
 Personal integrity
 Desire to protect reputation and career
 Firms’ concern for reputation
 Concerns about legal liability



Most interviewees (auditors generally excepted) believe that
the pressures on objectivity and independence are growing
over time, and are becoming somewhat worrisome. The main
driver of this change, according to our interviewees, is the
evolution of accounting firms into global, highly competitive, multidisciplinary consulting enterprises. There is a perception that this
evolution has led to the following:
i.

Fees are cut, and margins shaved, in order to win an
assignment, with the hope or expectation that more lucrative
consulting arrangements will be available with the client in the
future. This implies auditors are developing a stronger interest
in their relationship with management, perhaps at the expense
of their responsibilities to shareholders.
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ii. Audit firms have created not necessarily deliberately, an
internal culture whereby the role of the auditor is often seen as
inferior to the role of the consultant. This has made it more
difficult to attract and retain quality professionals to work on
audit assignments, and has created adverse economic and
peer pressures on auditors. When auditors are put into the
role of relationship managers, it is made clear to them that an
important element of their job is to help broaden the array of
services the firm provides to the client, and improve
profitability as well.


Most believe that the future will present even greater
challenges, if steps are not taken to contain these issues
today. There is a feeling that current safeguards may have been
effective in the past, but the pace of change has been so dramatic
that a new set of approaches may be needed. Again, auditors as
a group stand outside this general consensus, indicating a much
lower degree of concern.



The principal consideration behind a demand for new
approaches has to do with perception, more than real loss of
objectivity. Most people interviewed held that the volatility and
visibility of financial markets, meant that the stakes associated
with failures of objectivity and independence were growing rapidly.
There was a general consensus that cases of failure were more
widely reported, and with the huge increase in market
participation by retail or individual investors, the political pressures
to protect the consumer were growing. Barring a vigorous private
sector response, regulatory initiatives, which most would rather
avoid, were seen as inevitable.
10%

20%

A Real Independence Problem
Exists Today

A Perception Problem Exists Today
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30%
50%

A Perception Problem will Exist in
the Future Barring Change

A Real Independence Problem will
Exist in the Future Barring Change

In reporting the general consensus just described, it is important to
note that two of the segments stood out somewhat from the rest.
Auditors, while not unanimous, were more likely to make the case
that the current safeguards, with some modest updating, would be
adequate to deal with future pressures. They maintained that audit
functions and consulting services can co-exist indefinitely,
perhaps inelegantly, but without causing an erosion, or
perceived erosion, of objectivity and independence.
Regulators, for their part, were at the opposite end of a spectrum.
They generally maintained that the problem was a fundamental one,
and that the issues of perception were only going to grow in time. A
good number pointed to an eventual downturn in the economy, or a
major, prolonged market correction as being trigger events for a rapid
increase in political pressure, and they felt that the backlash caused
by disappointed investors would be severe. Their view was that
solutions were needed, sooner rather than later, and more
sweeping than modest.
KEY FINDING
PRESSURES ON INDEPENDENCE GROWING
Reasons:
 The more aggressive culture of the financial marketplace today
 Multi-disciplinary service offerings by audit firms
 Audits as loss leader
 Change in audit firm culture
 Scrutiny on the rise

In a nutshell, the general conclusion was that audits are not
significantly compromised today, and may be only slightly more
compromised in the future, if the current audit firm business model
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continues unchanged. However, more concern is attached to the
question of maintaining confidence in the soundness of financial
reporting, and a significant number feel that the current model is like
“a perception accident waiting to happen”.
This in itself is problematic, as the following chapters will describe. In
essence, this point of view argues for a very fundamental set of
changes in the current marketplace, to prevent something from
happening in the future, not something real, but something perceived.
Not surprisingly, it was hard for people to find common ground on
how much prevention, at whose cost, was appropriate.
Furthermore, most participants, with the notable exception of
regulators, felt their interests would be poorly served by a high profile,
high-tension debate about these issues. While on the one hand, they
might see the need for change and communication about change in
order to ward off perception problems, on the other they didn’t want to
increase the perception problem by increasing the reach and volume
of the debate.
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D. PRESSURES ON AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Having established the broad dimensions of concerns about auditor
independence, it is useful to dig deeper into the roots of these
concerns. During the course of the interviews, a good deal of probing
was done on the nature and extent of the pressures affecting auditor
independence, either in fact or in perception.
The main findings are as follows:




Virtually everyone agreed that when accounting firms only
did audit work, there was some risk of impairment, but that
the level of risk was acceptable. The inherent risk cited was
that the audit firm is paid by management, while performing a
function on behalf of shareholders, and that the interests of
management and shareholders do not always coincide perfectly.
There was a belief that in this environment, the risk was
minimized because audit firms had to care very deeply about their
reputation among shareholders for doing quality, reliable work,
since the audit was their bread and butter. Also, the sense was
that the independent directors could add more support to the audit
firm as needed, and that the audit firm would be more willing to
call on that support than might be the case if they had no other
assignments from management.

“Integrity is the
commodity they’re
selling” CEO

As audit firms developed new lines of business, their
preoccupation with audits was seen to be gradually in
decline. As people offered this point of view, they did not do so in
a critical way, but stated it as a matter of fact. They understood
why a professional services firm would want to expand and grow,
and that the existence of competition actually demanded that they
do so, to some degree.

“No one wants to pay
for the audit service.
It’s losing its value”
Analyst

There was an implicit understanding that asking firms to perform a
public interest function (audits) while operating in a free enterprise
economy, is something of a recipe for some problems. No one
offered a better solution (some discussed, but then rejected the
bank examiners model as too radical and costly), but all sensed
that there was a certain degree of tension which markets could
not naturally resolve, since the public interest function was not
market based.
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The large majority of interviewees in each segment
(including auditors) have sensed that in recent years
accounting firms have lost their preoccupation with audits,
and become much more preoccupied with growing new
areas of consulting revenue. Many felt that within firms, the
psychic and financial rewards were tilted heavily towards the
consulting side, and that auditors who wanted to be well
compensated and respected by peers, needed to support the
growth of the non-audit functions. This perception was even
shared by a fair number of auditors, who in some cases lamented
the new preoccupation.

“The power structure
at audit firms has
shifted dramatically”
Analyst

As people offered this perception, it was clear that some were of
the view that these pressures could lead to compromises of
objectivity, for example, where the size or profitability of a nonaudit relationship dwarfed that of the audit. The reasoning was
that the individual auditor, if not the firm or the office, would feel at
risk if they were to cause a breach in such a relationship over an
audit item.
However, even those who refused to believe that such a
compromise could occur, were generally concerned about the
appearance of such a situation. Typically, these views were
voiced as “If a problem ever occurred, such as a fraud or a major
restatement, this relationship would look bad, even if it had
nothing to do with the substance of the problem”.


Audit clients are also seen to have had a considerable role to play
in the increased pressures. This manifested itself in a number of
ways:
i.

The drive by all corporations to cut costs has led to
considerable pressures to cut audit fees. A fair number of
the CEO’s and CFO’s in our sample noted that they felt that
audit costs were high, and growing over time, especially for
those companies which had become more global in their
reach. They felt that while audits were necessary to
sustaining market approval, their relative value was declining
as other, more time sensitive forms of financial reporting took
precedence in the minds of shareholders and investors.

ii. There was no evidence that this drive to reduce audit
costs was motivated by a desire to see a more lax audit.
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CEO’s and CFO’s were actually at pains to indicate that they
valued the input of their outside auditors in terms of
understanding what was working well or poorly within their
companies. So while they wanted fees trimmed, they also
wanted a rigorous, top quality job done. Worth noting is that
they perceived that audit firms were willing to meet these
demands.

iii. Roughly half of the CEO’s and CFO’s interviewed said
that they liked to use their audit firms for non-audit
assignments, because they felt that it was likely to result
in better consulting at a more reasonable cost. They
reasoned that their auditors were better able to understand
their needs, that they had a relationship that worked, and that
the audit firm would be motivated to do a good job and charge
reasonable fees, knowing the client was a long term, important
relationship.
However, the other half of CEO’s and CFO’s took a different
view.
While they didn’t dispute the cost-effectiveness
question, they said that they generally preferred to avoid a
situation where outsiders might raise questions about the
relationship between client and auditor. Generally, they would
give only limited assignments to their audit firm, or allow them
to bid on tenders, but require that they be demonstrably better
than other bidders in order to get the work.
KEY FINDING
PERCEPTION RISKS RISING DUE TO SEVERAL FACTORS
 Firms are increasingly reliant on consulting
 Client pressures to cut audit fees, demand for consulting
support
 Psychic and financial pressures on audit partners
 Ability to meet appearance test of angry shareholders



Interestingly, most of those interviewed agreed on the question of
“earnings management” and its role in the auditor independence
equation. The commonly held view can be summarized as
follows:
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i.

Earnings management is not a new phenomenon,
although it is garnering more attention of late, because of
the long running bull market, the instant and dramatic
reaction to earnings reports which are outside the norms,
and the proliferation of media reporting on financial
affairs.

ii. While roughly one in three interviewees (across most
segments, much higher among regulators) feel that
earnings management efforts have become more
aggressive, a roughly equal number dispute that
assertion. Those who dispute the assertion offer that
emerging growth areas of the economy, such as technology,
entertainment, information, are exposing weaknesses in
accounting rules, either requiring more or allowing more
“judgement calls”, than would be possible in more traditional
areas of the economy. This point of view holds that if
judgement calls are possible, management will always tend to
err on the side of massaging reports for advantage.
iii. Most importantly, few feel that earnings management as
practiced today involves any meaningful participation by
auditors. Earnings management was characterized as highly
time sensitive, involving decisions made within a company,
and communications made directly with financial markets.
The audit firm is seen by most analysts, CEO’s, and CFO’s as
more or less irrelevant to this communication, except at the
end of a year, and in serving as a deterrent to fraud or gross
misrepresentation. While most interviewees accept the idea
of auditors reviewing quarterly earnings reports, not as many
felt that they should issue opinions on same. In fact, the
majority thought that this would be both costly and likely
counterproductive, in the sense that it might give the markets
a false sense of security about the reliability of numbers which
had only been reviewed, rather than audited.
iv. Consistent with this view, most felt that the demands of
analysts had little to do with the role of auditors. Some Buyside analysts said that they viewed the audit firm-client
relationship with suspicion, but tended to rely on their own
sources of information to base their investment decisions on.
They saw the audit as an essential part of good governance,
and felt that changes were needed for the future, but did not
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feel that their performance as analysts was being affected by
auditor independence issues today.


In discussing the question of earnings management, there were
three factors which people thought might represent exceptions to
their general views:
i.

Many felt that there was a greater potential for a large
corporation to put more pressure on a smaller audit firm,
or for a smaller auditor to avoid a dispute with a larger
client. While people said that they doubted that mismatches
like this occurred very often, some buy side analysts said they
would see it as a warning sign if the audit firm and client
seemed mismatched by size.

ii. There was a broad, but somewhat vague consensus, that
new sectors of the economy represented a greater
challenge to the auditor client relationship. Some felt that
audit firms were especially anxious to establish strong
relationships in areas of new growth. Also, there was a feeling
that accounting rules had been designed to apply to
companies which manufactured, shipped and sold traditional
services and goods, and that knowledge based product sales
offered more room for judgements to be exercised, because
rules were not so firmly established or understood. In this
circumstance, the reasoning went, there was more potential
for auditors to accept aggressive accounting practices, and for
appearance problems to develop.
iii. Finally, there was a general view that the largest and most
stable companies, especially those whose equities were
not seen as growth investments, were less likely than
other companies to be drawn into aggressive earnings
management. As a consequence, people were saying that
growth oriented stocks and mid cap companies might
represent a bigger area of challenge to the independence of
auditors.
In summary, a combination of economic pressures and
opportunities has contributed to the growth in potential for
perception problems around auditor independence. Within audit
firms, there has been pressure to expand non-audit revenues.
This has resulted in a changed internal dynamic, where psychic
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and financial rewards are skewed somewhat, reducing the
prestige of audit work.
From the client side, auditors feel pressure to cut audit costs, and
receive somewhat mixed signals about the potential to broaden
and deepen the relationship with non-audit assignments.
Consequently, while the relationship can sometimes seem to
carry great potential, it is somewhat inherently insecure. If this
sense of insecurity does not lead to real erosion of independence,
it can clearly add weight to a potential perception problem going
forward.
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E. CURRENT SAFEGUARDS FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
A good deal of time was spent exploring perceptions of current
safeguards and their ability to help protect against real or perceived
problems of auditor independence. This was another area where
certain segments stood out from one another.

In general,


Auditors were much more likely to say that the current
safeguards were adequate or needed only a slight amount of
fine-tuning.



Regulators, on the other hand, were much more of the view
that the current accounting firm model seemed
fundamentally unworkable, or if not, then major initiatives
would be needed to strengthen safeguards and protect
investor confidence in the markets.



Audit committee chairs tended to see independence safeguards
as a work in progress, requiring constant attention, and
continuous improvement.



CEO’s and CFO’s said that they assumed that current safeguards
were probably appropriate, but the more they discussed the
questions around non-audit services the more they indicated a
feeling that there might be room for too much discretion.



Analysts felt that the combination of safeguards, laws, regulations,
and litigation pressures were all necessary, but they also believed
that human temptation was always going to exist, and no system
could be perfect.

To the extent that some findings can be generalized, they can be
summarized as follows:


Most people felt that as long as audit firms did non-audit
work for their audit clients, there would need to be a certain
number of safeguards, and that these would have to be
updated from time to time.



Outside those who were or had been auditors, very few
people had any significant knowledge about the safeguards
that exist within the audit firm. There was a general
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understanding that firms tried to erect some sort of “walls” that
there were periodic rotations and reviews of partner work, and
that in-house training programs existed to help assert the
importance of independence. Most people said that they thought
these were all useful ideas, and were probably working as well as
they could.




However, the majority of respondents felt that if the
perception challenge was growing, these devices might
ultimately be insufficient to sustain confidence in the
independence of auditors. They felt that the judgement of
observers would turn on how the financial incentives and
penalties were organized: if it appeared that a firm had more
upside in bending to a client’s pressures, then internal processes
would only be of limited value. Not everyone felt that this was the
perception today, rather they were offering the view that internal
firm safeguards had limited prophylactic value if the scrutiny were
to become more punishing.
Most had a sense that there were laws and regulations
governing the question of independence, but few had a clear
picture of what they were, who mandated them, and how
rigorously they were applied. Participants saw a clear link
between the work of organizations like the SEC, the AICPA,
FASB, and NASBA. They felt that the work of these various
bodies had to be linked together, and given consideration in the
development of standards by the ISB.
FASB was seen as a necessary linkage because of the
perception that there were accounting judgement calls that
needed to be cleared up, especially in areas touching on one-time
charges, and affecting mergers and takeover activity. The SEC
was seen as a crucial link because most felt that “a regulatory fix”,
while distasteful, was inevitable if measures to limit the potential
problem were not taken voluntarily. The AICPA was looked upon
as an organization that needed to take a leadership role in
advancing the perception of the public interest role function of
auditing, even if this proved to be at odds with the business model
of major multi-disciplinary firms. State Boards were seen as a
vital part of the mix, as they have licensing leverage, and because
of the need to avoid a patchwork approach.
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Most people had little knowledge of the ISB to date, and
while judging that its work would be important, hoped that it
would take a somewhat higher profile in the future. At the
same time, not everyone agreed what the purpose and tone of
this profile should be. Some (analysts in particular) wanted the
ISB to be a voice somewhat independent both of the regulator
and the profession. Others (auditors most notably) wanted the
ISB to bring some balance to a debate they felt was imbalanced
by the public statements of the regulator. Still others (regulators
especially) wanted the ISB to represent the perspective of the
shareholder and investor community, including the retail or
individual investor, and move swiftly and visibly to remedy
problems and create a more sound framework for the future.



There was a widely held view that some existing rules may need
to be reviewed and replaced or updated in order to help build
credibility for the future. Many voiced the view that members of
audit firms might be unduly restricted in the financial transactions
they were permitted, and that rules regarding family relationships
might need to be modernized as well. Those who advocated
such changes were not looking for greater laxity, but were saying
that a new set of standards, in order to have credibility, should
logically strive to be as contemporary as possible.



Respondents were generally aware and mostly supportive of
the work of the Blue Ribbon Panel. There was a broad
conviction that Audit Committees could serve a more important
role in dealing with both substantive and perception issues around
auditor independence. While endorsing the direction, many were
at pains to point out a view that the quality of audit committees
varied widely (and likely always would), something which would
limit the effectiveness of this approach to managing future
problems. Also, a fair number of people offered the view that the
Panel took perhaps too narrow a view of the kind of qualifications
which might enable an Audit Committee member to do an
effective job.
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KEY FINDING
LOW AWARENESS OF CURRENT SAFEGUARDS
 Apart from auditors, few know much about in-firm safeguards
 More awareness would help reduce apprehensions
 But rising scrutiny may mean external pressures also needed
 Desire for ISB to work in concert with others, add careful profile to
debate

In summary, the majority view was that current safeguards needed to
be reviewed and updated. While most people who lacked first hand
experience weren’t really familiar with the current rules and firmspecific safeguards, they felt that if the perception challenge were to
grow, then the current self-regulatory approach would be insufficient
to meet the test of public confidence. Alternately, many offered the
view that the self-regulatory model would be sufficient if audit firms
only did auditing, or did only auditing for their audit clients.
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F. NON AUDIT SERVICES IN FOCUS
While the non audit services offered by accounting firms was easily
the most perplexing issue surrounding auditor independence in the
minds of our interviewees, it is instructive to break this category of
findings down in more detail.
For one thing, not all non-audit services conjured up equal levels of
disquiet, and some produced great consensus while others great
division. The findings can be summarized this way:


The situations which were more likely to raise concerns
about the prospect of a real or perceived problem of auditor
independence include the following:
i.

Situations where the size of consulting fees greatly
exceed the size of audit fees. Most said that this should be
looked at as a general principle, rather than a hard rule, since
some consulting arrangements were more costly by nature.
However, they felt that the perception test would be harder to
meet after a problem, if there were an imbalance of this sort.

ii. Situations where consulting revenues routinely exceeded
audit revenues. In such a circumstance, many felt that the
potential for a perception problem to develop was greater.
Some argued that such a situation should not be allowed to
occur, others argued that companies must take greater
precautions, (e.g. through Audit Committees and disclosure to
shareholders) if they were likely to find themselves going in
this direction.
iii. Situations where bookkeeping type services were being
provided to clients. Some clients seemed to feel that they
should be permitted to buy these services from their auditors,
especially in foreign or distant markets, provided that
accounting judgements were not being made by employees of
the audit firm. However, many auditors seemed to feel that
this was an area of potential reputation risk, and that the line
between judgement and non-judgement services was harder
to draw in today’s economy.
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iv. Situations where consulting contracts were awarded to
the auditor without competitive bidding. Roughly half of
the companies interviewed indicated that they avoided such a
practice, while others said that they used discretion, but
occasionally did so. Auditors generally were silent on this
question. Analysts, regulators, and audit committee chairs
were more likely to say that in a world where everyone had a
stake in preventing perception problems, this practice should
be avoided.
v. Situations where consulting assignments were so large,
or of a particular nature, so as to be logically touched on
by a subsequent audit. Some felt that installing computer
systems was not a problem, as long as the firm had a
demonstrated expertise, others argued that if the computer
system had anything to do with the financial reporting
systems, or if a major problem with the project would normally
be reported to shareholders, then the auditor would be in
serious conflict.

“Auditors should not
be allowed to sit in
judgement of
themselves” CEO/Audit
Chair

vi. Situations where the importance of the consulting
assignment was unusually important to the audit firm,
such as a contract in an area where the firm was trying to
develop a marketable expertise and the contract represented
an anchor for business development.
vii. Situations where the importance of a single client to an
individual partner, or to a particular office was unusually
high. While most said that the test which people talked about
was “whether the firm could afford to walk away from the
client”, they felt that the more appropriate test was “what
would the consequences be to the partner or the office that
walked away from a major client” over an audit dispute.


There were some areas where opinions were clearly in stress,
meaning that people felt pulled both ways, and considered the
matters to be important. These included:
i.

Situations where the audit firm was providing business
strategy advice to the client. Most people felt that with the
appropriate firewalls in place within the audit firm, this might
not cause a problem, but others felt that if the client followed
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the advice and the strategy failed, the auditors had a
reputation risk, which might impair their objectivity.
ii. Situations where tax advice turned into tax representation
or advocacy. While most said that this had traditionally been
a role which auditors had played, and that it had not caused
problems of independence in the past, there was a worry that
as perception questions became more prominent, this was a
more challenging situation. In particular, those concerned
talked about the prospect of audit firms becoming seen as
advocates for accounting rules which might be seen to work
against the interests of shareholder transparency.
iii. Situations where internal audit functions were
outsourced to the independent auditor. While most felt
that this was in no way problematic, a notable minority took
the position that this might lead to a lower standard of
protection for the investor.
KEY FINDING
CERTAIN NON-AUDIT SERVICES TRIGGER GREATER
CONCERNS
 Where consulting fees exceed, especially if routinely, audit fees
 Where bookkeeping services are provided
 Where consulting assignments were so large or of a nature to be
potential audit items
 Where assignment is key to a growth strategy of a consulting
division
 Where a client was disproportionately important to an individual
auditor or office

In summary, respondents generally held the view that the evolution of
audit firms into the consulting fields was logical. They felt that if
audits were not going to be performed by the public sector (as with
bank examiners) then the private sector providers must be afforded a
certain degree of latitude in terms of growing their businesses,
especially in a competitive sector. Many also felt that the provision of
most consulting services was not likely to create a real problem of
audit independence, but almost everyone agreed that the potential for
appearance problems to be created was quite significant.
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G. TESTING SPECIFIC SCENARIOS
In the course of conducting these interviews, a number of scenarios
were developed for use in focussing attention on the kinds of practical
situations in which an independence issue might or might not arise.
These scenarios, and the responses which they generated, are
summarized here.

SCENARIO I
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop
and install a new SAP computer system for their client, ACME
Manufacturing. ABC earns $10 million for the computer system work, and
$1 million per year for their audit of ACME. The consulting contract equals
about 1% of ABC’s annual revenues.

ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in
competitive bidding, and the question of whether such a contract would
impact the independence was raised with ACME’s audit committee, which
decided that there was no impairment. ACME management has the
necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the
necessary decisions around it.



The vast majority of interviewees did not perceive a real loss of
independence in this situation. However, a notable minority,
probably around 30% felt that there was a significant risk of
impairment, if things turned out badly around this particular
assignment.



Even more respondents worried that the perception of such a
large assignment could be troublesome, again if all did not go
smoothly.



Respondents indicated that a number of factors would determine
the degree of risk involved.
i.

First off, the sheer size of the contract was seen as a potential
perception challenge. Even though $10 million might be good
value for the client, and only a tiny fraction of the audit firms
business, there was a sense that observers would doubt that
the firm would be willing to walk away from such a
relationship, if that were necessary to protect the
independence of the audit. Auditors typically felt differently on
this issue, putting forward the case that the separation of audit
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and consulting practices within the firm, together with the
auditor’s and firm’s commitment to audit integrity would be
adequate to satisfy any doubts.
ii. The size of the consulting contract relative to the audit fee was
also seen as an important factor.
iii. The proportion of firm revenues represented by the total
billings to any single client were seen to have a significant
effect on auditor independence.
In general, “one off”
consulting assignments were seen as less troubling than a
steady flow of consulting revenue.
iv. Finally, the role of the audit partner was deemed important.
Respondents were aware that the lead engagement partner
can and often does become an advocate for a broader
relationship with a client, but most respondents felt that the
auditor’s participation should stop at introduction.


Everyone felt that a contract of that size needed to be submitted
to tender, and that the Audit Committee had to be involved in the
process of awarding the contract. Some felt that to be awarded
such a contract, the audit firm should have to beat other bids by a
considerable margin.



Interviewees generally felt that investor confidence would not be
shaken by this scenario. However when asked to consider the
same scenario where the consulting contract equaled 20%, rather
than 1%, of the audit firm’s revenues (or the consulting arm’s
revenues), most agreed that there would be both a significant
degree of real and perceived risk.



Interviewees’ assessment of risk was linked to their levels of
confidence in the current safeguards. Auditors were confident
that internal safeguards such as ‘Chinese walls’, or firewalls were
sufficient. Management and audit committee members felt that
as long as companies appropriate disclosure of such
assignments, they could mitigate risks, although they tended not
to want to do this very often. (As well, there was a separate
question about disclosure requirements. Some felt that disclosure
to a broader audience of investors would help deter real
objectivity problems, and mitigate perception problems: others felt
that doing so would only serve to fuel suspicions that
inappropriate behavior was rising.)
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The analyst and regulatory communities shared concerns about
the size and nature of the assignment, and felt current safeguards
offer little or no guarantee of independence. They were more
likely to feel that nothing short of a strict separation of the audit
and consulting services would really mitigate the risk in such a
situation. They differed in how plausible or important they thought
this to be.

SCENARIO II
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his
annual audit of Kate Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of CFO, with
a rich compensation package.
Doe immediately stops doing any work for Kate Inc, and notifies the
management of BBB about the offer. After a short period of reflection, he
takes the job, and ends all financial ties to BBB. BBB immediately
conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of Kate, makes sure it
selects a senior partner to work on Kate’s audit in the future, to ensure
proper skepticism, and schedules QA and Peer Review inspections for
next year.



An overwhelming majority of respondents saw neither a real loss
of independence nor an unacceptable risk that auditor
independence could be impaired in the future.



Most also agreed that the perception of reasonable investors
would not be negatively affected in this situation. Many noted that
this type of situation is highly common, and quite productive from
the standpoint of both the audit firm and the client. They
reasoned that the audit firm could not attract good people, if those
people had to foreclose the option of moving to the client side at
some time. They also felt that clients should have the opportunity
to recruit people who understood their business well and had
established good working relationships within their organization.



Beyond feeling comfortable because this situation arose so often
without creating problems, respondents were also satisfied that
the procedures taken by the individual and the audit firm were
effective and important.



The only areas of concern that appeared to have any resonance
had to do with timing questions. Most took considerable comfort
from the fact that the offer was not made until the opinion was
signed for the year, however a few noted that audits were
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increasingly a year round process. Similarly, there was some
debate about whether current guidelines were clear enough on
the question of what type of discussion qualified as a reportable
matter, or a step towards an offer.


While some were concerned that there seemed to be a
correlation between incidents of earnings misrepresentation and
the recruitment of auditors into CFO positions, most seemed to
feel that this was not causal, but coincidental.

SCENARIO III
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computers, based in New
York. Ace’s Vancouver office does some routine bookkeeping work for
Moll’s Portland subsidiary, MCP.
MCP accounts for no more than 4% of Moll Computer’s revenues, and
would not normally be visited by an audit team, because of its size. The
bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of
the Ace Portland office, which is separate from the audit department. The
work includes processing company-supplied data, which is then reviewed
and approved by MCP officials, before being forwarded to Moll’s
headquarters in New York. Ace personnel do not prepare any source
documents, sign checks, have custody of assets or make significant
judgements.



There was a clear lack of consensus about this scenario. Most
did agree that it probably did not pose a significant real problem of
independence, but many worried that the question of
bookkeeping assistance can be a difficult one.



There was a feeling that even if the work did not involve
“significant” judgements, outside observers might doubt the
auditor’s independence, if the firm’s staff was implementing
accounting treatments which were likely to be a subject of dispute
with the auditor down the road.



A number of auditors said that their firms prefer not to do any of
this type of work because of concerns about how it might be
perceived. They felt that even if they could make the case about
the routine and non-judgmental nature of the work, that
participating in any aspect of internal accounting was better
avoided.
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While several CEO’s and CFO’s said that this was a type of
assistance, which they liked to be able to draw upon, they
acknowledged that it could fall under unfavorable scrutiny.



When asked how they would feel if the number of markets being
served were to grow over time, many began to feel
uncomfortable. Even if the dollar values were not material, they
simply felt that it implied too close a relationship, and too stable a
flow of revenues to the non-audit service side of the firm.



There was a general feeling that the distance between the New
York headquarters and a Portland subsidiary office provided
some, but limited comfort.

SCENARIO IV
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s
Boston office. She has two relatives who happen to work for two different
Tendy clients.
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer. He has $8000
in Able’s stock option plan. Jane and her husband earn a combined
income of more than $200,000 per year. Able’s audit is done by Tendy.
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly
growing company in Portland Maine. Portland is 120 miles from Boston,
and all services for Simple are provided by Tendy’s Portland office. Jane
has no involvement in either client’s account. She sees her brother
socially about once a year.



There was a remarkably vigorous discussion about this scenario.
It was a subject of careful consideration and seen as very topical.



Interviewees overwhelmingly sensed that no real impairment of
independence had occurred with respect to either the brother or
the husband. This was largely because Jane was seen to have
no material ability to affect the audit of either company. Many felt
that the relationship and distance rules should have significance
only if Jane was involved in the audit itself.



But at the same time, respondents acknowledged that the
perception issues were real, critical to Jane’s reputation, the
reputation of her firm, the perceived integrity of the audits, and the
reputation of the clients involved.
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There was a widespread feeling that the rise of dual income
families, the increased entry of women into the workplace and the
increasingly global reach of audit firms has rendered relationship
and distance rules somewhat archaic. Most felt that the current
rules governing personal relationships are quite strict and created
an impediment to attracting and retaining new entrants to the
profession. Others argued that it was only appropriate that
auditors be held to a higher standard than other participants in the
financial community are, given the attestation function they
perform. They felt that any relaxation of rules, even admittedly
archaic ones, might be perceived as a weakening of the
commitment to independence.



The majority felt that application of sound personal judgement by
the auditor was the best assurance of a high degree of
independence when it came to personal relationships. Most
people were of the view that there was no substitute for general
principles of conduct applied with personal judgement.



As well, many interviewees looked to the internal culture of audit
firms as vital. They talked about the importance of “tone at the
top” and in some cases, wondered aloud if it was as clear and
firm as it had been in the past. Some auditors acknowledged
some concerns of this sort as well.



Most people felt that the perception question surrounding Jane’s
husband was less significant than those involving her brother.
They reasoned that the amount of money involved was
immaterial, and that the husband’s role in the company was not at
a senior enough level to cause concern.
With respect to Jane’s brother, there was more concern,
particularly because of his role as CFO and the fact that his firm
was rapidly growing. There was a feeling that his company might,
over time become a more important client of the firm. Ultimately
people were reassured by the fact that Jane and her brother lived
in different cities, and rarely had contact with each other. When
asked how they would feel if “Jane’s brother regularly contacted
her for advice on investments” most felt more uncomfortable with
such a situation.
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Full disclosure of these situations was viewed as critical to
maintaining the reality and perception of independence. Most
people felt the auditor had a strong obligation to disclose any
potential (real or perceived) conflict arising from personal
relationships not just to their own firm but to their clients as well.
Audit committees were cited as an important line of defense for
management and shareholders. The overriding assumption is
that once disclosed, these relationship issues could be assessed
on a case by case basis to determine whether they offended
either the shareholders or management sense of propriety.



In an age of jet travel and instant Internet access, many
interviewees signaled that the comfort provided by geographic
separation was diminishing over time.

In summary, four scenarios were tested which explored a number of
contemporary dimensions of the question of auditor independence.
In all but one case, there were mixed opinions, and a lack of
consistency in how participants felt current guidelines could or would
normally be applied. This underscored a call for greater clarification
and a hope for greater consistency over time, in how auditors and
their clients set and meet the tests of independence. This degree of
uncertainty was highest when significant consulting relationships
were at stake, and when family relationships were involved.
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H. POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
During the course of the interviews, a fair bit of probing was done to
determine what respondents felt should be priorities for change.
Accepting as a starting point that not all audiences were equally
convinced that change was needed, or that much change was
needed, the main points findings can be summarized as follows:


The broad majority of respondents felt that there are too
many “gray” areas where the role of auditor as consultant to
their audit clients is concerned. In some cases, this feeling
had to do with the fact that people are unfamiliar with the
regulations and policies that currently exist, in others it was based
on a feeling that as things have developed, new, clearer
standards are needed.



A fair number of people advocated a requirement of full
disclosure as a way to both deter an unhealthy relationship
between auditor and client, and to inform investors of any
risks related thereto. However others, CFO’s most notably, did
not like this idea, as they felt that disclosure generally is
associated with the idea of having done something inappropriate.



Almost everyone interviewed felt that the challenges of
auditor independence would not be solved by writing new
“bright line” type policies. They reasoned that these would act
not as a deterrent, but an opportunity for those who wanted to act
inappropriately to understand how to structure such actions
successfully.



Most preferred the idea of setting forth broad principles,
which should underpin the relationship between auditor and
client. Alongside these broad principles, many endorsed the
idea of developing a series of “best practices” advisories.
These would set out common situations, and indicate what the
best practice would be for auditors and clients to follow in order to
protect against real and perceived independence problems.
Some went further and suggested that those companies which
chose not to follow these best practices should be required to
disclose this fact, and their reasons for deciding not to. However,
many preferred not to go this far, arguing that this step would
convey too great a degree of suspicion where none might be
warranted.
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There was a wide consensus that any changes to strengthen
standards should be accompanied by a review of existing
rules, and the termination of those that are archaic. These
might include certain aspects of the restrictions on financial
dealings by employees of audit firms, and more contemporary
perspectives on the issues of spousal relationships.



Most interviewees felt that an essential or important part of
any effort to strengthen independence and the perception of
independence, had to have a strong communications
component. They reasoned that to affect perception, those
whose perceptions mattered had to be aware of both the existing
safeguards as well as any new increments that might be added to
the mix. While some segments felt that the audiences in question
were institutional and corporate exclusively, others (especially, but
not exclusively the regulatory segment) felt strongly that the
individual investor was a key audience, perhaps more important
than any other.
KEY FINDING
A VARIETY OF POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
 Fewer gray areas, more clarification, better communication
 Broad principles and best practices, not bright lines
 Greater disclosure, stronger audit committees
 Review existing rules, add and subtract as necessary
 Review audit firm internal practices



While a fair number of interviewees felt that the best ultimate
solution to the independence question would be for
consulting and audit practices to separate, few anticipated
that this would happen in the short term, if at all. There was
also an acknowledgement that even if this did occur, the residual
issue of a service provided to shareholders, but contracted for
with management, would still offer the potential for perception
problems. As a result, people generally expected that the best
approach would involve a number of components:

1. A review of audit firm internal practices, to ensure that
standards are as high as they should be, and as consistently
applied as possible. While many felt that independence
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procedures might be areas of competitive advantage, there was
also a feeling that the reputation of the profession as a whole rose
or fell on the performance of the weakest performer. As such,
some argued that a more standardized approach might be more
advisable.
2. A gathering and communication of the variety of component
safeguards affecting independence. Both those working within
the audit firms and those outside, felt there would be value in
drawing together, in one source, the major component elements,
whether they emanate from FASB, SEC, ISB, AICPA, State
Licensing Boards, etc.
3. Greater precision about the acceptable and unacceptable
practices in seeking or accepting consulting assignments
from audit clients. Many people, including a fair number of
auditors, said that they were unsure about certain practices and
felt that more precision, or at least a clear restatement of how
current guidelines should best be applied, would be helpful. This
could include several components:
i.

The nature of marketing activities for non-audit
assignments with audit clients. Who should be involved,
linkages to the audit assignment, competitive bidding, are all
subjects which could potentially be treated under this heading.

ii. The nature of non-audit services which have greater
potential to create the risk of perception problems. At the
present time, many felt that they had a great deal of discretion
in this area, perhaps more discretion than was advisable, if the
perception risk was to be reduced.
iii. The size or relative thresholds of audit versus non-audit
assignments. While people said that a simple numerical
formula probably wouldn’t make sense, in the context of “best
practices” they felt some guidance would be appropriate.
iv. The appropriate role of senior audit engagement partners
in managing a broader relationship with the client. During
the course of the interviews it was clear that different audit
firms had different practices, and that clients were occasionally
uncomfortable with some current approaches. Some auditors
and clients feel that they can best assure independence if the
auditor is the point person for the whole relationship, others
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feel that this represents a significant risk, at least from a
perception standpoint.
v. This was particularly sensitive when it came to the
question of compensation procedures for audit partners,
who were acting as relationship managers. Different
policies exist in different firms. While some clients are
comfortable with the fact that firms reward auditors for
relationship growth (as one component of performance, with
only a modest impact on overall compensation), others feel
that any linkage between the compensation of the auditor and
the growth of the non-audit relationship is entirely
inappropriate.
KEY FINDING
GREATER PRECISION SOUGHT AROUND NON-AUDIT WORK
 Nature of marketing and selling activities
 Nature of services which should not be offered to audit clients
 Size or thresholds for audit vs. non-audit fees
 Appropriate role of audit partners
 Compensation for audit partners

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

- 36 -

EARNSCLIFFE
RESEARCH &
COMMUNICATIONS

I. SUMMARY OF KEY SEGMENT DIFFERENCES
As the various sections of this report have indicated, the audience
segments for this study had different perspectives on a number of
matters. This section of the report will attempt to summarize in one
place the nature and importance of these differences.
CEO’s

There was a mixture of opinions registered by the CEO’s in this
study: this was not a particularly homogeneous group. Generally
speaking, they were more concerned about good corporate
governance, and wanted to be able to rely on their auditors to keep
their companies from reporting anything which might later be a cause
of embarrassment. Many indicated a strong feeling that the quality
and reliability of financial statements issued by their company was a
matter which touched very directly on their personal reputations.
Most of the CEO’s felt that there was not a real problem of auditor
independence, but that there was a slight, but growing perception
issue which should be addressed. They saw their auditors more as
suppliers than business partners, and had few strong feelings one
way or another about using them for non-audit services.
While they liked the idea of having the flexibility to do so if it was the
most cost-effective solution for a particular consulting assignment,
they understood the arguments against having too significant a
relationship with the audit firm, and were prepared to accept a world
where this flexibility might be reduced or even eliminated.
To some degree, the more they thought that scrutiny of non-audit
assigments to their audit firm would rise in the future, the less they
wanted to be placed in a position of influencing or even supporting
such a decision personally.
CEO’s generally felt that the pressures to manage earnings were not
all that new, although the pace and severity of market reactions was
increasing over time. They felt that there had always been and
always would be important judgement calls to be made about
accounting treatments and thought that a professional, cordial and
respectful relationship with their auditors was a useful element of
helping arrive at sound decisions.
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While the majority voiced some frustration at the profile and tone
taken by the SEC in raising issues of earnings management and
audit independence, most accepted that politcal stakeholders felt
apprehensive about the breadth of participation in stock markets, and
wanted to err on the side of caution. Some argued that it was
necessary to use language which would create an impact, since the
debate might not take place otherwise.
Ultimately CEO’s felt that a combination of measures would be
necessary to ease the potential of perception problems: more clarity
around current regulations and safeguards, better education of
investors about the safeguards which exist (in order to reduce the
pressures on political and regulatory bodies) as well as the kinds of
ideas favored by the Blue Ribbon Panel.
CFO’s

This group was fairly homogeneous on some issues, and showed
clear divergence on others. The main points of agreement began
with the fact that they were, next to auditors, the segment which was
least convinced that independence (real or perceived) was under
significant pressure.

“You can never get to
zero risk” CFO

CFO’s generally saw their auditors as key suppliers, partners in
business to a limited degree, and they very much liked to have a
direct relationship with the most senior engagement personnel.

They felt that their audits were conducted with a high degree of
independence and objectivity and felt that whatever pressures were
inherent in the auditor-client relationship were being successfully
managed by themselves. While they acknowledged the role of the
audit committee, they saw it as being a “failsafe” in the event that they
failed to do their jobs properly. As such, they were somewhat less
enthusiastic about the Blue Ribbon recommendations, although not
opposed in principle.
Some CFO’s took quite a firm and restrictive view of the idea of hiring
their auditors to do non-audit work. A few said that they almost never
would consider it, a few others said that audit firms could bid on
assignments, but had to be considerably superior to other bids in
order to win the assignments. Another number said that they liked
the idea of using their auditors for many assignments and that as long
as they submitted a competitive bid they would get the assignment.
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Finally a few felt that they were comfortable making some assigments
to their auditors directly, without a competitive process, and were
ready to defend those decisions as legitimate management
prerogative.
Almost all of the CFO’s were wary of the idea of new regulation
around financial reporting, claiming that current rules were already so
complex that even the best honest effort could still run afoul of some
rules inadvertently. They argued that the largest clients and the
largest auditors generally operated in a fully appropriate fashion and
that they should not be saddled with additional costs and complexity
because of the misbehaviour of a small minority. They urged that
solutions to any perception problems show restraint around the
instinct to regulate, establish best practices rather than bright lines,
educate investors, and target offenders as much as possible.

Auditors
As a group auditors were more homogeneous than any other except
perhaps regulators. There were some important generational gaps,
noted below, but otherwise auditors had a fairly common view of the
world.
The general sentiment was that the quality of audits was improving
over time, as audit firms became more expert, and more able to bring
a broader set of skills to bear on behalf of a particular client. Auditors
were also insistent that there were no greater issues of independence
today than there had been in the past, and they recognized that the
unique role and structure of the relationship presented natural
challenges.
Auditors felt that as a group they had been rigorously trained, and
within firms, constantly coached, to maintain the state of mind
required to provide proper attest services. They felt that the issues of
independence and audit failures had been exaggerated by media
coverage, and that there were far more significant problems of real or
perceived conflict in the role played by securities firms and
investment bankers.
Auditors accepted the potential for perception problems to occur, and
recognized that these questions were becoming more prominent. At
the same time, they bridled at the notion that they might have to
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consider altering their business model, simply to avoid a perception
problem, when the reality was that there was no impairment.
Notwithstanding their sense of frustration with the issue and the
debate, there was a view that some remedies would be helpful in
defusing the tensions. Their preferred actions included education of
investors about current safeguards, clarification and modernization of
some of the rules, publication of best practices, and an expanded role
for Audit Committees. They were inclined to reject the idea of bright
lines as ineffective.
While the views described above were generally held, a handful of
those auditors who had the longest experience took a somewhat
different view on the impact of the multi-disciplinary evolution of their
firms. They felt that over time, despite safeguards and best efforts
within firms, auditors couldn't help but notice a certain difference in
the environment surrounding client relationships.
They felt that auditing was portrayed within firms as less profitable
than consulting work, and increasingly important only as a way of
generating consulting opportunities. They felt that the compensation
structure was creating a disincentive for good people to stay in
auditing, and for clients to respect the auditors who served them.
While they did not conclude that this had impaired objectivity and
independence to date, some wondered whether the management
structure and business strategies of their firm could or would continue
to take appropriate account of the unique role of the independent
auditor.

“Audit Partners are
being made to feel like
sales people” Auditor

Audit Committee Chairs
This segment was fairly homogeneous, and enthusiastic about
participating in the study. Without exception, they all felt that the work
of the Audit Committee was of great importance, and increasing in
importance over time.
Also without exception was the view that the companies they served
took the role of the audit committee very seriously (which could be to
some degree a self-selection bias). They saw themselves as serving
the interests of shareholders and the rest of the Board, rather than
management. They felt that company management supported their
efforts to inquire into important issues, have a private relationship with
the audit firm, and to offer dissenting opinions as appropriate.
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They felt that the number of problems in financial reporting were
probably not increasing in number, but were certainly increasing in
profile. They sensed that the pace of change and competition, as
well as the heightened scrutiny, meant that regardless of whether
there were real problems of independence, a greater degree of
caution needed to be exercised.
All felt that one of the more important matters for them to be involved
in reviewing was the awarding of non-audit assignments to the audit
firm. As a group, they tended to feel that the less of this that went on,
the better, and several said that they supported a policy of no
additional work for the audit firm.
They did not quarrel with the instinct on the part of audit firms to
expand into other areas, and were reluctant to support solutions that
restricted their access to new lines of business. At the same time,
they had a keen sense of the need to meet their own obligations to
shareholders. Insofar as remedies were concerned, they favored
greater clarification of current guidelines, the publication of best
practices to help provide guidance in new areas, and a general
principles rather than bright lines approach.
KEY FINDING
CONCERNS ABOUT INDEPENDENCE VARY BY TIME, SEGMENT

Real
problem
today

Perception
problem
today

Real
problem
tomorrow

Perception
problem
tomorrow

Auditors

None

Slight

None

Slight

CEO’s

None

Slight

None

Moderate

CFO’s

None

Slight

Slight

Moderate

Buy-side

Slight

Moderate

Slight

More
serious

Sell-side

None

Slight

Slight

Slight

Audit
Committee

Slight

Slight

Moderate

More
serious

Regulators

Moderate

Moderate

Serious

Serious
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Regulators
Regulators were a unique audience in this study, and were fairly
homogeneous in their views. They regard the issues as more serious
and more pressing than the other segments, and are impatient to see
solutions coming out of the private sector stakeholders.
While some took the view that there were few real issues of
independence today, the view of SEC interviewees was that there
were immediate problems of fact today. All felt that perception
problems were growing, and that they needed to be dealt with sooner
rather than later.
In particular, there was concern that a downturn in the economy
and/or a major market correction might cause a number of problems
in past reporting to become evident. That coupled with the prospect
of a significant deterioration in the paper wealth of millions of
consumers meant that pressure for a political intervention into the
marketplace was highly likely, if protective measures were not taken
in advance.
There was a sense that the pace of change in the economy, means
that accounting rules have trouble keeping up, and this leads to a
greater degree of discretion in reporting than existed in the past.
Together with the fact that so many investment decisions are being
made on the basis of non-audited information, regulators would
rather strengthen the role of the independent auditor, or at least not
see it weakened in any way. With only one or two exceptions, those
regulators included in this sample felt that the business model of the
largest accounting firms was putting pressure on independence and
on the appearance of independence.
The ideal world for most regulators would likely be one in which audit
firms did only audit work. Failing that, they would prefer that audit
firms did their consulting work only for non-audit clients. Failing that,
they want to see a significant ramping up of effort to safeguard
independence and to ensure that individual investors have the
protection of independent audits and as importantly, feel as though
they have that protection. In offering this latter point of view, it was
clear that regulators felt that this study should take into account the
views of individual, and not just institutional investors.
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While regulators value the kind of safeguards which firms impose
internally, they signaled that they didn’t feel that these would be
adequate over the long term. They worried that the profession had
been moving too slowly to deal with the issues around non-audit
assignments and were looking for the ISB to improve the pace of
activity in this area.
They strongly felt that efforts should be stepped up to educate
investors about the roles and responsibilities of various stakeholders
and the steps that are taken to assure reliable information, along with
the limitations therein. This, they felt, would help reduce the risk of a
severe political backlash in the future.
(A methodological point: while virtually all other interviews were done
on a one to one basis, several of the SEC participants preferred to be
interviewed as a group, a desire that was accommodated)

Buy Side Analysts
Buy side analysts were fairly homogeneous, with the exception of a
few who had previously worked as auditors and whose perceptions
were influenced by that experience. Overall, they tended to be
sanguine and skeptical about the question of auditor independence at
one and the same time.
They were generally of the view that financial reporting and the
audited financial statements could be trusted, while asserting that the
audited statements were of minimal importance compared to other
sources of data. They felt that the relationship between auditors and
clients was becoming an unhealthy one, and that something probably
ought to be done about it.
While offering this latter opinion, they also indicated that they
personally, as well as their firms, were careful not to become
victimized by financial reporting which misrepresented the
performance of companies. In effect, they were saying that they
would rather see steps taken to remedy the situation than not, but
that they were taking their own protective measures in any event.
Their view that the relationship between auditors and clients was
becoming unhealthy was partly based on a belief that the incidents of
abuse were increasing in number over time. Some felt that there had
been an embarrassing and costly increase in such incidents.
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But mostly it was based on a view that the financial dynamics of the
evolving relationship were unavoidably dangerous, and a desire to
insure against a more significant increase in problems in the future.
They saw the inclination to cut prices on audits in order to win more
lucrative consulting assignments as the kind of circumstance which
would have the potential to corrupt even the least corruptible
individuals.
As such, they were not impugning the integrity of the auditors, nor
even saying that it had been all that damaged to date. However, they
had a strong sense that virtually anyone’s motivations can be altered
if the economic penalties and incentives are substantial enough.
Finally, buy side analysts felt the issue of reliability of financial
reporting would only become more prominent as the hunt for value in
a highly priced stock or rapidly correcting market became more
intense.
They recognized the impact that they as a group had on earnings
management, and lamented that markets seemed to be overreacting
to short term considerations, and that they were contributing to that
effect. At the same time, they argued that it was up to companies to
issue financial statements, and up to the market to react as it chose
to. They would not take responsibility for efforts by companies to
manage earnings, did not think it was a new phenomenon, and
considered it to be more or less manageable, from their standpoint.

Sell Side Analysts
Sell side analysts were also quite homogeneous in their views. As a
group, they have concerns about the pressures on financial reporting
and auditor independence, but they feel that they can live with the
status quo.
There is concern about the prospect that a downturn might expose
more problems than people imagine, but sell side analysts indicate a
clear stake in market momentum and worry about the prospects of a
high profile debate undermining confidence in the markets.
They see the annual audit as a “table stakes” part of financial
disclosure, perhaps losing importance over time, but always
something that will be necessary and useful. They are quite
confident that the largest companies and the largest auditors
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generally do a good job and resist pressures to manage earnings too
aggressively. They assume that there is a fair amount of give and
take in the normal auditor-client relationship and that earnings
management is not a new phenomenon.
As a group, they are highly resistant to the idea of greater regulation
of any sort, preferring to believe in the ability of the market to correct,
over time, any excesses. While offering their views, several in this
segment acknowledged that their views tended to fluctuate, and that
their perceptions were highly influenced by what appeared in the
media.
They had generally a low level of detailed understanding of the
current safeguards around auditor independence, and had not done
a great deal of thinking about the issues of how to set standards for
the future. For the most part, there was some skepticism about the
potential for Audit Committees to do much to alter the current
situation.
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J. CONCLUSION
This study examined a complex web of issues among a set of
audiences, which often had different points of view. As such, the idea
of drawing conclusions has some inherent hazards.
Nonetheless, we believe it is both necessary and possible to draw
some conclusions based on these findings, and would focus attention
on the following:
1. Most of those interviewed felt that the quality, depth and reliability
of financial reporting in the United States is better than that found
anywhere else.
2. Most felt that auditors of public companies perform a valuable
function and do so in a way which reflects a high degree of
integrity, competence, and independence.
3. Most felt that the evolution of accounting firms to multi-disciplinary
business service consultancies represents a challenge to the
ability of auditors to maintain the reality and the perception of
independence.
4. The challenge is most apparent in two circumstances:
i.

When auditors pursue or accept consulting assignments with
their audit clients.

ii. Because of the increasingly intense media and investor
scrutiny which exists today.
5. While some believe that perceptions of the independence of
auditors is already suffering some corrosion, more people take
the view that damage is inevitable in the future if greater
precautions are not taken to protect the perception of
independence.
6. Auditors stand at one end of the spectrum of views on these
issues, tending to feel that they are managing the pressures
effectively, and that few further precautions are required. At the
other end of the spectrum are regulators, who feel that the
profession needs to move more aggressively and rapidly to
strengthen safeguards on a voluntary basis, or have a more
stringent regime imposed. The rest of those segments included in
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this sample fall somewhere in between these poles, closer to the
auditors’ view on the question of problems to date, and closer to
the regulators on the need for further action going forward.
7. No one believes that these challenges can be solved easily, or by
one set of measures. Instead, there is a tendency to favor a
combination of efforts, involving a variety of different stakeholders:
i.

The ISB should set out very clear standards regarding nonaudit assignments for audit firms with their audit clients.
These should ideally be accompanied by a set of “best
practices” which can be added to and amended as necessary
over time, (these might more appropriately be issued by
another organization, such as the SEC Practice Section).
These standards might usefully address the following
subjects:
 Those consulting services which are more or less
appropriate for audit firms to supply to their audit clients.
 The ideal and acceptable practices for selling and bidding
on consulting assignments.
 A view on the relevance of the size of the consulting
arrangements, in absolute terms, relative to audit fees, and
whether on a one-off or sustained basis.
 The ideal and acceptable roles for the audit engagement
partner to play in securing and helping manage non-audit
work. Compensation should be addressed as well.

ii. An effort should be made to regroup in one source all the
measures in place presently to safeguard auditor
independence and objectivity. This would include government
and professional regulations and codes of conduct, audit firm
and client practices which are common, (if not codified) and
should incorporate a discussion of the importance of scrutiny
by buyers/investors.
iii. A careful review of existing rules, regulations and standards
with a view to making them as clear and contemporary as
possible. Where necessary to enhance credibility, some rules
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could be abandoned, and some penalties or sanctions could
be strengthened.
iv. An initiative to raise the level of investor familiarity with the
safeguards which are in place and the care they should take
as investors in consuming the financial reports of companies
they might invest in.
We look forward to discussing this draft report with the ISB prior to
issuing a next draft in advance of the upcoming Board meeting.
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APPENDIX A - INTERVIEWEES BY GROUP
CEO’S OF SEC REGISTRANT COMPANIES
ABN-AMRO
Airtouch
BF Goodrich
BP Amoco
Brunswick Corporation
Cendant
Chase Manhattan
Guardian Life Insurance
IMC Global
Knight-Ridder
Nipsco Industries
Nucor
Ryder System, Inc.
TIAA-CREF
United Stationers
York International
Total

Bill Thiel
Sam Ginn
David Burner
Lawrence Fuller
Peter Larson
Henry Silverman
Walter Shipley
Joseph Sargent
Robert Fowler Jr.
Tony Ridder
Gary Neale
David Aycock
Tony Burns
John Biggs
Randall Larrimore
Robert Pokelwaldt
16

CFO’S AND CONTROLLERS OF SEC REGISTRANT COMPANIES
Abbott Laboratories
Dave Diamond
Allstate
John Carl
Amerada Hess
John Schreyer
Howard Smith
American International
Avon Products
Robert Corti
Chase Manhattan
Joseph Sclaffani
Dennis Powell
CISCO Systems
Colgate-Palmolive
Steve Patrick
CostCo
Richard Galanti
Hewlett Packard
Robert Wayman
Interpublic Group
Thomas Volpe
Lexmark
David Goodknight
McDonald's
Mike Conley
McGraw-Hill
Robert Bahash
Newell-Rubbermaid
Donald Krause
Pfizer
David Shedlarz
Republic National Bank of New York
Stan Martin
RJR Nabisco
Dave Rickard
Unicom
Robert Berdell
United Airlines
Nancy Tauber
USG Corporation
Richard Flemming
Washington Mutual
William Longbrake
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Wells Fargo
Wells Fargo
Total

Tom Emerson
Jim Thvedt
24

AUDITORS
Arthur Andersen
Arthur Andersen
Arthur Andersen
BDO Seidman
BDO Seidman
Deloitte & Touche
Deloitte & Touche
Deloitte & Touche
Ernst & Young
Ernst & Young
Ernst & Young
Grant Thornton
KPMG
KPMG
KPMG
Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Pricewaterhouse Coopers
Total

Jack Benedik
Patrick Condon
Michael Underwood
Al Ferrara
Steve Ferrara
Robert Giordano
Ralph Siegel
Tom Hoover
Lou Kramer
Tom Vogelsinger
Steve Almassy
Kunio Yoshioka
Paul Wirth
Dan Schmitt
Steve Marsh
Tom Colligan
John Baily
Keith Klaver
George Kennedy
19

BUY-SIDE ANALYSTS
Aeltus Investments
American Express Asset Management
Dresdner RCM Global
Equitable Life Insurance
Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle
GATX Capital Corporation
Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
Janney Montgomery Scott
Mutual of Omaha
Nationwide Insurance
Pilgram & Baxter
Security Benefit Life Insurance
Selective Life Insurance
The Chubb Corporation
TIAA-CREF
Transamerica
Voyageur Asset Management
Wanger Asset Management

Scott Fox
Bill Miller
William Price
Peter Noris
Judy Daily
Ken Foster
James Rowan
Jerry Lombard
John Maginn
Dave Diamond
Gary Pilgram
John Cleland
Robert Rank
Michael O’Reilly
Martin Leibowitz
Gary Rolle
James King
Harold Litchenstein
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Total

18

SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS
BancBoston Robertson Stephens
Bear Stearns
First Chicago Capital
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
Goldman Sachs
HSBC Securities
Janney Montgomery Scott
JC Bradford
Keefe, Bruette & Woods
Lehman Brothers
McFarland Dewey
Morgan Keegan
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter
Nomura Securities
Prudential Securities
The John Nuveen Company
Total

Brian Bean
Patricia McConnell
Gerald Byrne
Ester Mills
Sarah Smith
Gabrielle Napolitano
Jeffrey Haroldson
James Myer
Emily Evans
David Berry
Bob Williams
Alan McFarland
Minor Perkins
Joanne Pace
Mike Lowry
Paul Scura
George Adams
17

AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRS AND MEMBERS
Amerada Hess Corporation
Amerada Hess Corporation
Anixter
Brunswick
Brunswick
Citigroup
Citigroup
Consolidated Edison
IMC Global
Interpublic Group of Companies
Lehman Brothers
Merrill Lynch
Motorola
Pfizer
Tribune
Unicom
Unicom
Walgreen
Total

Robert Wilson
Bill Spencer
John Petty
Michael Callahan
Jeffrey Bleustein
Dudley Meecum
Alan Belda
James O’Brien
Harold MacKay
Frank Borelli
Michael Ainslie
John Phelan
Anne Jones
Don Cornwell
Arnold Weber
James Compton
Bruce DeMars
Jim Schwemm
18
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REGULATORS
American Stock Exchange
FDIC
NASDAQ
National State Boards of Accountancy
National State Boards of Accountancy
National State Boards of Accountancy
New York Stock Exchange
Office of Comptroller of the Currency
Office of Thrift Supervision
SEC
SEC
SEC
SEC
SEC
SEC
SEC
SEC
SEC
US General Accounting Office
Total

Sal Sodano
Robert Storch
Pat Campbell
Dennis Spackman
Robert Gray
David Costello
James Cochrane
Zane Blackburn
Timothy Stier
Arthur Levitt
Norman Johnson
Isaac Hunt
Brian Lane
Robert Bayless
Walter Schuetze
Robert Walker
Lynn Turner
Harvey Goldschmid
David Walker
19
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APPENDIX B - THE INTERVIEW GUIDE
A. CONTEXT
1.

In general terms, how would you characterize the effort/quality/reliability
of information sharing by public companies with the investing public?
How has it changed?

2.

How would you characterize the relationship between most public
companies and their auditors? What about your approach?

B. AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
1.

Have you personally observed situations where the objectivity or
independence of an auditor of a public company was impaired, or was in
serious risk of impairment?

2.

What factors are most likely to contribute to
independence?
What about to the perception
independence?

3.

Is impairment of independence becoming more common or more rare?
What impact, if any are these factors having? (Probes: financial
markets changing, technology, consolidation, rules, regulations,
safeguards, earnings management, analysts estimates, etc.)

4.

In your opinion, is there an issue of auditor independence?

impairment
of a loss

of
of

i.

Whenever circumstances are such that the potential for impairment
exists

ii.

Whenever the circumstances are such that the risk of impairment
occurring is greater than what might be considered normal.

iii. Only when circumstances actually result in an action which
demonstrates a lack of independence.

5.

As far as you are concerned, is there an issue of auditor independence:

i.

Whenever a reasonable person might perceive a loss of
independence, regardless of whether there has been any material
impact, because it undermines confidence in the financial markets.

ii.

When a loss of independence has actually occurred.
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iii. When a loss of independence has occurred that has resulted in
negative impact on investors.

C. THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS
1.

Based on what you know, are current prohibitions governing the
relationship between audit firms and their clients appropriate?

2.

Over and above the prohibitions, are there adequate safeguards to help
prevent impairment?

3.

Here are some examples of safeguards, which are or can be taken to
mitigate against a real or perceived loss of independence. Would you
comment on the usefulness of each.

i.

Chinese walls /physical separation/internal governance/tone at the
top

ii.

Stepped up role for Audit Committee

iii. Disclosure to
procedures

4.

the

public

of

independence

safeguards

and

From your perspective, what do you think the main priorities of the ISB
should be? What sort of effort do you think that the ISB should make to
communicate with different audiences over the next few years?

i.

Perception/reality:

ii.

Prevention/remedial:

iii.

Bright lines/best practices/clear rules:

SCENARIO A
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop and
install a new SAP computer system for their client, ACME Manufacturing.
ABC earns $10 million for the computer system work, and $1 million per
year for their audit of ACME. The consulting contract equals about 1% of
ABC’s annual revenues.
ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in
competitive bidding, and the question of whether such a contract would
impact the independence was raised with ACME’S audit committee, which
decided that there was no impairment. ACME management has the
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necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the
necessary decisions around it.
1.

In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?

2.

If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be
impaired?

3.

Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts,
mistrust the financial reporting of ACME? Of the reliability of audited
statements more generally?

4.

Would your views change if the consulting contract equaled about 20%
instead of 1% of ABC’s revenues? Why/Why not?

5.

Would your views change if the audit partner helped win this consulting
contract, and as a result, is it likely to have a positive impact on the audit
partner’s compensation by ABC?

SCENARIO B
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his
annual audit of Kate Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of CFO, with
a rich compensation package.
Doe immediately stops doing any work for Kate Inc, and notifies the
management of BBB about the offer. After a short period of reflection, he
takes the job, and ends all financial ties to BBB.
BBB immediately conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of
Kate, makes sure it selects a senior partner to work on Kate's audit in the
future, to ensure proper skepticism, and schedules QA and Peer Review
inspections for next year.

1.

In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?

2.

If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be
impaired?

3.

Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts,
mistrust the financial reporting of Kate Inc.? Of the reliability of audited
statements more generally?

4.

Would your views change if John Doe turned down the job, and
continued working on Kate’s audits?

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

-55-

EARNSCLIFFE
RESEARCH &C
OMMUNICATIONS

SCENARIO C
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computers, based in New
York. Ace’s Vancouver office does some routine bookkeeping work for
Moll’s Portland subsidiary, MCP.
MCP accounts for no more than 4% of Moll Computer’s revenues, and
would not normally be visited by an audit team, because of its size.

The bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of
the Ace Portland office, which is separate from the audit department. The
work includes processing company-supplied data, which is then reviewed
and approved by MCP officials, before being forwarded to Moll’s
headquarters in New York. Ace personnel do not prepare any source
documents, sign checks, have custody of assets or make significant
judgements.
1.

In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?

2.

If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be
impaired?

3.

Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts,
mistrust the financial reporting of Moll Computers? Of the reliability of
audited statements more generally?

4.

Would your views change if MPC accounted for about 20% instead of
4% of Moll’s revenues? Why/Why not?

5.

Would your views change if the accounting assistance was provided to
five of Moll’s subsidiaries, instead of one?

SCENARIO D
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s Boston
office. She has two relatives who happen to work for two different Tendy
clients.
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer. He has $8000
in Able’s stock option plan. Jane and her husband earn a combined income
of more than $200,000 per year. Able’s audit is done by Tendy.
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly
growing company in Portland Maine. Portland is 120 miles from Boston,
and all services for Simple are provided by Tendy’s Portland office.
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Jane has no involvement in either client’s account. She sees her brother
socially about once a year.

1.

In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?

2.

If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be
impaired?

3.

Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts,
mistrust the financial reporting of either Able or Simple? Of the reliability
of audited statements more generally?

4.

Would your views change if Jane’s brother called her regularly for
advice about investments and personal money management?

5.

Would your views change if Jane Smith provided some consulting work,
but no auditing services to Able?

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

-57-

ISB
Independence
Standards
Board

BOARD
William T Allen, Chairman
Director
Center for Law and Business
New York University

July 13,1999

John C Bogle
Senior Chairman
The Vanguard Group. Inc
Stephen G Butler. CPA
Chairman and CEO
KPMG LLP

Robert E Denham
Partner
Munger. Tolles & Olsen LLP
Manuel H Johnson
Co-Chairman and
Senior Partner
Johnson Smick
International

Philip A Laskawy. CPA
Chairman and CEO
Ernst & Young LLP
Barn C Melancon. CPA
President and CEO
American Institute of CPAs
James J Schiro, CPA
Chief Executive Officer
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

STAFF
Arthur Siegel, CPA
Executive Director
Richard H Towers. CPA
Technical Director
Susan McGrath. CPA
Director

Dear______ :

I am writing to ask you to contribute half an hour of your time to an important research
effort.

The Independence Standards Board (ISB) was established by the Securities and Exchange
Commission to provide and maintain independence standards for auditors of public
companies. As part of its mandate, the ISB has commissioned Earnscliffe Research and
Communications to conduct a small number of interviews among the most senior executives
in a variety of business fields Earnscliffe is a firm highly experienced at conducting this
type of research.
Attached please find a letter of request from Earnscliffe for an interview. The subject of the
interview will be your views on how well auditor independence is maintained today, and
how best to ensure auditor independence in the future. The views of those who agree to
participate will be reported without attribution The findings will be used to help shape the
agenda for the ISB in the years to come.
These interviews are ideally conducted in person, however if an in person interview is
impossible, a telephone interview can also be arranged. Every effort will be made to do the
interview at a time and in a location convenient for you.

We very much appreciate the challenge of finding a half an hour to spare, and hope that you
will give this request favorable consideration If you would like to know more about the
research or have any other questions, please do not hesitate to contact Art Siegel, Executive
Director of the ISB at (212) 596-6141.

Sincerely,

William J Cashin Jr., CPA.
CFA
Project Director

Christine Bricker
Assistant Technical Director

William T. Allen
Chairman
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July 13, 1999

Dear_______ :

Earnscliffe Research and Communications has been retained by the
Independence Standards Board (ISB) to conduct a number of
research interviews with a sample of very senior people in various
business fields.
Further to the letter from the Chairman of the ISB, we are writing to
ask if it would be possible to arrange an interview. Roughly one half
hour of your time would be required. The subject would be your
views on how well auditor independence is maintained today, and
how best to ensure auditor independence in the future.
As is customary with this type of research, the views of those who
agree to participate will be reported without attribution. The findings
will be used to help shape the agenda for the ISB in the years to
come.

Elizabeth Nickolas of my office will be in touch to follow up on this
letter in the next day or two. We very much hope you will be able to
find the time to share your views, and every effort will be made to
conduct the interview at a time and a location convenient to you. If
you would like more information before considering this request,
please do not hesitate to contact me at (613) 233-8080 or Art Siegel,
Executive Director of the ISB at (212) 596-6141.

Sincerely,

Bruce A. Anderson
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